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Abstract—Three-Dimensional Networks-on-Chips (3D-NoCs)
have been proposed as an auspicious solution, merging the
high parallelism of the Network-on-Chip (NoC) paradigm
with the high-performance and low-power cost of 3D-ICs.
However, as technology scales down, the reliability issues are
becoming more crucial, especially for complex 3D-NoC which
provides the communication requirements of multi and many-
core systems-on-chip. Reliability assessment is prominent for
early stages of the manufacturing process to prevent costly
redesigns of a target system. In this paper, we present an
accurate reliability assessment and quantitative evaluation of
a soft-error resilient 3D-NoC based on a soft-error resilient
mechanism. The system can recover from transient errors
occurring in different pipeline stages of the router. Based on
this analysis, the effects of failures in the network’s principal
components are determined.
Keywords-Reliability Assessment; Fault-tolerant; 3D
Network-on-Chip; Soft-Error; Architecture.
I. INTRODUCTION
Global interconnects are becoming the largest per-
formance bottleneck for high-performance Multi/Many-
core Systems-on-Chip (MSoCs). For more than a decade,
Network-on-Chip (NoC) interconnects have been proposed
as a promising solution for future MSoC designs [1]. The
NoC paradigm offers more scalability than conventional
shared-bus interconnects and allows more processing ele-
ments (PEs) to be efficiently integrated into a single chip.
Despite the higher scalability and parallelism offered by a
NoC system over traditional shared-bus based systems, it is
still not an ideal solution for future large scale MSoCs. This
is due to some limitations such as high power consumption
and low throughput from NoCs with large dimensions.
Taking NoCs to the third dimension has been proposed to
deal with the above problems, as it was a solution offering
lower power consumption and higher speeds [2], [3].
As feature sizes and supply voltages continually decrease,
systems that have implemented these interconnects have
become more vulnerable to soft errors. Shivakumar et al. [4]
analyzed the transient error trends for smaller transistors
and showed that the occurrence rate of transient faults is
significantly higher than permanent faults. In particular,
they expect the transient error rate for combinational logic
to increase dramatically. Currently, soft error handling is
mostly focused on memory and latches error which can
be tackled by Error Correction Code. Therefore, future
integration systems need a suitable solution to deal with soft
errors.
Recently, numerous techniques have been proposed to
handle soft errors [5]–[8] in NoCs; however, the reliability
of the proposed techniques is still not well investigated. The
most conventional method to evaluate the error resilience is
injecting faults into the system and checking the output’s
accuracy. This kind of evaluation, especially at the gate
level, requires a massive amount of time and computing re-
sources. Moreover, the correction module is not sufficiently
investigated in the reliability evaluation stage. Although the
correction module helps to handle fault occurrences, it also
suffers from an increase in fault probability.
In this paper, we present an efficient soft-error resilient
mechanism and architecture for reliable 3D-NoC systems.
We also present an accurate formulation of the reliabil-
ity and vulnerability of the proposed 3D-NoC architecture
against soft-errors. Our assessment method is based on the
Markov state model [9]. The fault-tolerance architecture
is modeled as several states that include all of the possible
failure cases. To switch between states, the repairability,
and the failure rate is required. Based on the state model,
a reliability function can be generated using probability
functions. Moreover, this paper presents a metric named
the Reliability Acceleration Factor (RAF). This parameter is
used to separate the reliability from the technology parame-
ters, or operating conditions. By using the characteristics of
the architecture and its fault-tolerance mechanism, the RAF
value only represents the efficiency of the fault-tolerance
mechanism alone.
II. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE OVERVIEW
The 3D-Network-on-Chip (3D-ONoC) router block di-
agram is shown in Fig. 1. The router has three pipeline
stages: (1) BW (Buffer Writing), (2) NPC/SA (Next Port
Computation and Switch Allocation), and (3) CT (Crossbar
Traversal).
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Figure 1: Proposed Soft Error Resilient 3D-NoC router
architecture.
The router architecture contains seven Input-port modules
for each direction in addition to the Switch-Allocation and
the Crossbar module, which handle the transfer of flits to the
next node. The Input-port module is composed of two main
elements: Input-buffer and the Next-Port-Routing module.
Incoming flits from the previous node or the local core, are
first stored in the Input-buffer. Since 3D-ONoC uses a Look-
Ahead routing algorithm, the output port value is already
calculated by the previous node/core. Therefore, the output-
port value is sent with request signal to the Switch Allocation
module. At the same time, the Next-Port-Computing module
uses the routing information (destination and output-port) to
calculate the routing i nformation for the next node, labeled
as next-output-port. With the grant from Switch Allocation,
the flit will be sent through the Crossbar to the next node
together with the next-output-port value.
A. Soft-error Resilient Mechanism
Our main goal in proposing the SER-3DR (Soft-Error Re-
silient 3D-Network-on-Chip Router) is to develop a highly-
reliable and low-cost technique to recover from soft-errors
in all pipeline stages of the router.
For the errors in the pipeline stages, we propose a Soft Er-
ror Resilient Algorithm (SERA) , as shown in Algorithm 1.
In the baseline OASIS-NoC, the router has three pipeline
stages: BW (Buffer Writing), NPC/SA (Next Port Comput-
ing and Switch Allocation in parallel) and CT (Crossbar
Traversal). Since the NPC/SA stage (Routing and Arbitrat-
ing) is where a majority of the complex combinational logic
exists and it executes routing for the router, this stage is the
one we selected for the SERA algorithm.
As illustrated in Algorithm 1, SERA routes a flit from an
input port to an output port. The input flit’s data (in flit)
is first written into the input buffer during the BW (Buffer
Writing) stage (line 1). Second, SERA executes the first-
time NPC (NextPortComputing) and SA (SwitchAlloca-
tion) stages which output the next port[1] and grants[1]
respectively (lines 3-4). The NextPortComputing computes
the routing path for the next node, similar to the look-
Algorithm 1: Algorithm for SER-3DR
// input flit’s data
Input: in flit
// output flit’s data
Output: out flit
// Write flit’s data into buffers
1 BufferWriting(in flit)
// Compute first time of NPC and SA
2 next port[1] = NextPortComputing(in flit)
3 grants[1] = SwitchAllocation(in flit)
// Compute redundant of NPC and SA
4 next port[2] = NextPortComputing(in flit)
5 grants[2] = SwitchAllocation(in flit)
// Compare orginal and redundant to detect soft-error
// Soft-error on NPC
6 if (next port[1] 6= next port[2]) then
// roll-back and recalculate NPC
7 next port[3] = NextPortComputing(in flit)
8 final next port = MajorityVoting(next port[1,2,3]);
9 else
// No soft-error on NPC
10 final next port = next port[1]
11 end
// Soft-error on SA
12 if (grants[1] 6= grants[2]) then
// roll-back and recalculate SA
13 grants[3] = SwitchAllocation(in flit)
14 final grants = MajorityVoting(grants[1,2,3])
15 else
// No soft-error on SA
16 final grants = grants[1]
17 end
// After detection and recovery, the algorithm
finishes with CT
18 out flit = CrossbarTraversal(in flit, final next port, final grants);
ahead routing algorithm, and the SwitchAllocation handles
the input port to output port routing. Third, the redun-
dant processes of the NPC and SA are performed with
these outputs: next port[2] and grants[2] (lines 4-5). In the
next step, SERA compares the outputs of the original and
the redundant processes. If next port[1] is different from
next port[2], a soft-error occurred in the NPC, the algorithm
then calculates the NPC a third time and uses majority voting
to decide the final value (line 7-8). Otherwise, the final
value is assigned as the first result (line 10). The SA is
also processed in a similar fashion to the NPC: it starts by
determining the occurrence of any errors, then voting on a
value or assigning the first value (line 12-17). After detection
and recovery, SERA finishes with crossbar traversal (line
18). The flit will be forwarded to the next node in the routing
path or to the local core.
III. RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT
A. Mean Time Between Failure
In this section, we present a methodology to calculate the
reliability of the system using the Markov State Model and
the reliability function [9]. The reliability of a system with
respect to soft errors can be evaluated using the Mean-Time-
Between-Failure calculation that follows:
MTBF = lim
s→0
R(s) (1)
where R(s) is the reliability function of the system in the
Laplace domain [9], which can be calculated based on the
Markov state models as shown in Fig. 2. Each state Si of
the Markov model represents a possible status of the system.
The status is defined as each case where an element of the
system fails, which can lead to unpredictable operations. If
the operation in Si state is correct, we define this state as
“healthy”. If the system is unable to operate correctly in
state Si, we define this state as “faulty”.
Assuming the system has a set S which includes states
from S0 to Sm in its Markov state model. We use S0 to
represent the initial state of the system. The set of healthy
states and set of faulty states are defined as:
H , {Si ∈ S|the system works correctly} (2)
F , {Si ∈ S|the system not working} (3)
where:
• H is the set of states which still maintain the operation
of the system,
• F is the set of states which the system fails.
The reliability function R(s) in Equation 1 is defined as
follows:
R(s) = P (H) = 1− P (F) (4)
Faulty StatesHealthy States
𝜇(n+2)−2Δ𝑡
Figure 2: A Markov-state reliability model for a m states
system with n non-failure states.
As shown in Fig. 2, each state Si represents a status
of the system during operation. There are two subsets,
healthy states H = {S0, S1, ..., Sn−1} and faulty states
F = {Sn, Sn+1, ..., Sm−1}. The transition rate are defined
as follows:
• λ is the fault rate a component in the system which can
represent for a transition from a element of set H to a
element of set F.
• µ is the repair rate a component in the system which
can represent for a transition from a element of set F
to the element of set H.
The final MTBF can be calculated based on the healthy
states as:
MTBF = lim
s→0
(P (H(s))) = lim
s→0
n−1∑
i=0
Si(s) (5)
B. Fault Model
Before analyzing the reliability of the system and calcu-
lating the MTBF, we need make two assumptions about the
failure of the system.
• The system starts with a default all components healthy
state. In Fig. 2, the initial status is: S0 = 1 and Si = 0
with i 6= 0.
• The transition rate λ and µ are constants and per-
determined.
However, the fault rate and repair rate depend on the
technology parameters, running environment and operating
circumstances. In order to separate them from the fault rate
value, we propose these assumptions:
• The fault rate has a linear relationship to the area cost
of the module.
• The fault rate has a linear relationship to the operating
time of the module.
• The fault rate is affected after the module is attached
to a system.
In this fashion, the fault rate only depends on the area cost,
the operating time and the efficiency of the reduction of the
fault rate that is provided by the fault-tolerance mechanism.
Thus, for a system with k components, its fault rate is given
by:
λsystem =
k∑
i=1
fiORiARiλunit (6)
where:
• unit is a select module as a reference for calculation.
In our method, we use the original design as a unit.
• ORi is the operating time ratio of component i to unit.
• ARi is the area cost ratio of component i to unit.
• fi is the changing rate caused by attaching the module i
to the system. If the system has no impact to the failure
of module i or module i is standalone, fi = 1. If the
system has a fault-tolerance mechanism for module i,
fi < 1.
Soft errors occur over a short period of time, typically
within a single clock cycle. Because of this, the combina-
tional logic has the ability to self-correct soft errors. On the
other hand, the memory units (latch, flip-flop,...) still record
failures.
C. Reliability Evaluation
In order to evaluate a fault-tolerance method, we intro-
duce a parameter named the Reliability Acceleration Factor
(RAF), which is defined as:
RAF =
MTBFFT
MTBForiginal
(7)
where MTBFFT and MTBForiginal are Mean Time Be-
tween Failures of the Fault-Tolerant and the original system,
respectively.
Based on analysis of the operation of the original and
fault-tolerant system, we can obtain both MTBFs using
Equation 5. Moreover, by using Equation 7, the RAF param-
eter is separate from the fault rate of the unit module. In this
fashion, the RAF parameter only represents the efficiency of
the fault-tolerance mechanism.
Figure 3: A simplified Markov-state reliability model for:
(a) the original system; (b) the fault-tolerant (FT) system.
In order to evaluate a fault-tolerant system which consists
of both original modules and correction modules, we model
the fault-tolerant system to have a Markov state similar to
Fig. 3 (b) with:
• S0 is the initial state.
• S1 in Fig. 3 (b) is the failure state of the original system
which is given by a transition rate λD1.
• S2 in Fig. 3 (b) is the failure state of the original system
which is given by a transition rate λD2.
• SC−F in Fig. 3 (b) is the failure state of the repair
module.
Because of the protection from the fault-tolerance technique,
the FT system can handle some kinds of faults. Therefore,
we define the transition rates as:
• λD is the fault rate of the original system (D).
• λC is the fault rate of the repair module of the FT
system.
• µD is the repair rate which is provided by the repair
module (C).
• λD1 is the part of the fault rate in the original which
is handled by the repair module (C).
• λD2 is the part of the fault rate in the original which
the repair module (C) cannot correct.
Based on the Markov state of the two systems, as shown in
Fig. 3, the MTBFs are given as:
MTBForiginal =
1
λD
(8)
and
MTBFFT =
1
λD2 + λC
(9)
By applying Equations 6, 8, and 9 to Equation 7, we
have:
RAF =
1
(fD ×ORD ×ARD) + (ORC ×ARC) (10)
where:
• fD = λD2/λD is the ratio of the failure rate of the
original system after and before applying the fault-
tolerance mechanism.
• OCx is the ratio of operation of the module x to the
original system (D).
• ARx is the ratio of area cost of the module x to the
original system (D).
Equation 10 shows the RAF function based on the ar-
chitecture modifications in area cost and operation and the
reduction of the failure rate.
IV. DESIGN AND EVALUATION RESULTS
Our proposed system (SER-3DR) is integrated into the
3D-ONoC [2], [3]. We designed the system in Verilog-HDL,
and synthesized it using the 45nm technology library. We
evaluated the hardware complexity, power consumption and
speed. We also evaluated performance using three bench-
marks: Matrix-multiplication, Transpose, and Uniform were
selected. For comparison, we also implemented and simu-
lated the baseline LAFT-OASIS [2], and Triple Modular
Redundancy of the NPC/SA based on OASIS (TMR) [5].
In order to demonstrate the reliability, we analyze our
architecture to provide the RAF parameter in Eq. (10) and
provide some comparison with another mechanism.
A. Hardware Complexity
Table I depicts the implementation result of a single router
of the original OASIS system, the TMR router [5], and the
proposed SER-3DR router. The router is designed for a 3D
Mesh with 7 ports, 32 bit flit-width, Stall-Go flow control
and wormhole forward mechanism. When compared with
the original LAFT-OASIS router architecture, the SER-3DR
requires slightly more logic area cost (14.98%). The TMR
router costs 45.20% more because it triplicates the NPC and
SA stage. The frequency decreases from 801.28 MHz to
655.74 MHz (−18.16%). Also, the TMR system increases
the power consumption to 30.31 mW (+18.30%). The
proposed design slightly increases the power consumption
from the baseline’s 25.62 mW to 27.13 mW (+5.90%).
Table I: Hardware complexity comparison results.
Design Max Freq. Total Power Logic’s area # TSVs
(MHz) mW ) (µm2)
LAFT OASIS 801.28 25.62 14,920 164
TMR-OASIS 763.36 30.31 21,664 164
SER-3DR 655.74 27.13 17,154 164
B. Network Performance Evaluation
For this evaluation, we used the three benchmarks over
five injection rates : 0%, 8.33%, 16.67%, 11.11%&6.67%
(in Routing and Switch Allocator) and 33%. The evaluation
results with Transpose and Uniform are shown in Fig. 4
(a and b), respectively. We perform these benchmarks for
3 models (SER-3DR, LAFT-OASIS and the TMR). The
network transmission time or average delay is presented as
a bar graph. We also inject the soft-errors inside the baseline
model (LAFT-OASIS) and measure the transmission time.
Its failure time and complete finish time are depicted in line
graph format.
For the Transpose benchmark in Fig. 4(a), we found that
the average latency slightly increased from 20.113 cycless
to 20.505 cycles (+1.95%) for an error injection rate of
0%. With different error injection rates, we can see that the
average latency slightly increased from 20.505 cycles for a
0% error rate to 21.092 cycles for a 33% error rate. Uniform
benchmark has a 9.06% increase in transmission time with
an absence of faults, while Matrix has a 10.02% additional
transmission time. In the faulty cases, SER-3DR requires
additional intervals for detecting and recovery.
To perform the throughput evaluation, we also used the
above benchmarks with five injection rates as shown in
Fig. 4 (c and d). For the Uniform benchmark, the throughput
is slightly degraded due to the short packet length which
increases the impact of redundant cycles.
C. Reliability Comparison
In this section, we compare the soft error resilience tech-
nique designed for the two modules: Routing and Switch Al-
location. We select the TMR and two architectures from [7],
[8]. The architecture by Prodromou et al. [8] and Yu et
al. [7] use monitors to verify the accuracy of the output
values. To verify the output value, they predefine a set of
rules based on the architecture of the monitored modules.
If the output value violates one of the rules, the monitor
module can determine the failure and decide the next step.
The architecture by Yu et al. [7] allows the system to re-
execute the task again to correct the failure. Prodromou
et al. [8] does not provide any recovery method for the
detected failure. Although the set of faults for the routing and
arbitrating modules consists of 7 and 13 faults, we assume
both architectures can handle 100% of transient faults in this
evaluation.
For our proposal [5] and Yu et al. [7], we use Eq. 10 to
calculate the RAF value. The reliability function of TMR
is obtained from [9]. The original module is not modified
to implement the fault-tolerance architecture. Therefore, the
area cost and operating ratios (ARD and ORD) of the
protected module both equal 1. Since the operation of the
correction module follows the operation of the protected
module, the operating ratios of the correction module ORC
are both equal to 1. The area ratios ARC of the correction
module are shown in Table II. Since our proposal can handle
100% kind of the error, we assume that Yu et al. [7] also
has the same capacity.
As shown in Table II, our proposed architecture has a
medium area cost overhead (54.46%). Both monitor based
architectures have a small area overhead (9% and 3%).
The TMR architecture has the largest area cost (+204.33%)
but it has the least impact on performance and architecture
modification. Although monitor based architectures provide
a small area overhead, they only cover the faults which
violate their set of rules. Therefore, a new architecture
requires another set of rules to handle soft errors. On the
other hand, our proposal and TMR can cover 100% kind
of transient fault and adapt to any architecture without
significant modifications.
In terms of RAF (Reliability Acceleration Factor), the
TMR attains a value of around 1.33. Our architecture pro-
vides a RAF of 1.84. For monitor-based architectures, Yu
et al. [7] provides the best protection with 11.11; however,
this value is attained under the assumption that the design
will cover 100% of failures. The architecture by Prodromou
et al. [8] does not improve due to the fact that they did not
implement a recovery module.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented an accurate reliability as-
sessment and quantitative evaluation of a soft-error resilient
3D-NoC system based on a soft-error resilient mechanism.
The system can recover from transient errors occurring in
different pipeline stages of the router. Evaluation results
show that the system has about 1.84 times improvement
in MTBF while handling 100% of all tested error types.
Moreover, the system can achieve a high level of transient
error protection with a small latency increase of 18.16%
when compared to the baseline non-protected system.
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